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MARCH 1980	 NUMBER 3
FEDERAL FUNDS AND FEDERAL COURTS—
COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT LITIGATION
AS A TESTING GROUND FOR THE
NEW LAW OF STANDING
GEORGE	 BROWN *
Struggles over the use of C.:01ninunity Development Block Grant
funds do not simply involve interpretations of the [1-lousing and
Co mmunity Development Act!. but are part. of much broader con-
flicts over the control and use of resources, and over broad public
policy issues.
—froth an "Advocacy Guide - to the Com-
munity Development Block Grain Program '
INTRODUCTION
The doctrine of standing to sue in federal court. has long been a favorite
whipping- boy for commentators and judges alike. Over the last decade, the
Supreme Court's pronouncements On standing have created confusion and
sharp differences within the lower federal courts, 2 and have called forth a
steady drum beat. of academic criticism." Most attention has focused on the
effect of the standing doctrine upon constitutional challenges to federal, state
and local actions,. and on its effect upon challenges to decisions of federal
regulatory agencies. This article focuses on the operation of standing in a
slightly different context.: federal grant-in-aid litigation.
Federal aid to state anti local governments has risen dramatically over the
last two decades from an annual level of 7 billion dollars in fiscal year 1960 to
an estimated 85 billion dollars in fiscal year 1980. 4 Between 1967 and 1977
* B.A., 1961, Harvard: LL.B., 1965, Harvard Law School. Professor of Law.
Boston College Law School. An earlier version of this article was presented at a con-
ference on Federal Grant Law, sponsored by the United States Advisory Commission
on Intergovernmental Relations, December 12, 1979.
' 12 CLEARINcitousr, RI:v. 601, 641 (1979 Supp.) ['hereinafter cited as Advo-
cacy Guide].
2 An excellent example of judicial disagreement over how to approach stand-
ing issues is the split decision in American Soc . ); of Travel Agents, Inc. v. Blumenthal,
566 F.2d 145 (n.(:. Cir. 1977) (2-1 decision).
E.g., Tushnet. The New law if Standing: A Plea fin- Abandonment, 62 Coits,TELL
L. REV, 663 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Tuslinef].
' U.S. Orrick: OF NIANIA.ca.:No . .srr AND lit/WILT, SPECIAL ANALYSES BUDGET OF
THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT FISCAL. YEAR 1979, 175 (1978).
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the average annual increase in federal grants to state and local governments
was 16.2 per cent, while overall budgetary increases were at an average level
of 9.8 per cent.'' There is strong evidence that the halcyon days of automatic
increases are over, but grants will remain a major component of federal
domestic outlays.
Along with the rise in funds has come a substantial volume of litigation
concerning the uses of these funds. While grant litigation is a relatively new
phenomenon, federal funds have generated a "veritable explosion" of lawsuits
in recent years." For example, the number of suits by grantees against the
grantor federal agencies concerning such matters as termination, reduction,
or denial of grant funds is growing rapidly.'
The principal source of the explosion, however, is challenges by third
parties: non-grantees who claim to be aggrieved either by the award, or po-
tential award, of federal funds to a state or local government, or by the man-
ner in which the grant is administered. Challengers have included the follow-
ing: excluded direct beneficiaries of a grant program; 8
 indirect beneficiaries
who claim that funds should have been awarded to benefit them rather than
some other group;• opponents, usually neighbors, of a federally aided proj-
ect; " public interest groups. such as civil rights advocates, who wish to invoke
general "strings" in a grant program, such as a nondiscrimination provision,
to alter existing practices in their communities:" and subgrantees and pro-
viders of services to grantees, who claim that the grantee has violated contrac-
tual obligations to them."
Frequent invocation of threshold doctrines, and extensive analysis of
them, pervade grant litigation. These obstacles can include lack of an implied
right of action under the grant stattne,' 3
 failure to satisfy the jurisdictional
amount," ripeness,i 5
 and failure to exhaust administrative remedies.'" How-
ever, standing.has been the threshold doctrine most frequently invoked by
Id. at 184.
6 I. MICHELMAN AND T. SANDALMV, GOVERNMENT IN URBAN AREAS 275 (1972
Supp.) (third party suits) [hereinafter cited as MICHELMAN AND SANDALOW]. This article
deals principally with suits involving governmental, as opposed to private, grantees.
E.g., Southern Mut. Help Ass'n v. Califano, 574 F.2d 518 (D.C. Cir. 1977);
see. Cappalli, Federal. Grant Disputes: The Lqwyer's Next Domain, l I URB. LAW. 377 (1979)..
8 Plaintiffs in the welf are cases are typical of this category, see, e.g., King v.
Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968).
" E.g., Philadelphia Welfare Rights Org. v. Embry, 438 F. Supp. 934 (E.1). Pa.
1977).
1 " E.g., Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
" E.g., NAACP v. Harris, 607 F.2(1 514 (1st Cir. 1979); see United States v.
City of Chicago, 549 F.2(1 415, 422 (7th Cir. 1977).
12 E.g., People's Housing Dev. Corp. v. City of Poughkeepsie, 425 F. Stipp.
482 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
13 E.g., id.
' 4 E.g., Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600 (1979).
15
 Knoxville Progressive Christian Coalition v. Testerman, 404 F. Su pp. 782
(F.D. Tenn. 1975).
E.g., Johnson v. County of Chester, 413 F. Stipp. 1299. 1310-11 (ED. Pa.
1976); see NAACP v. Wilmington Medical Center, 426 F. Stipp. 919 (D. Del. 1977),
rev'd, 599 F.2d 1247 (3d Cir. 1979).
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defendants, and the most troublesome for the federal courts. Most of the
difficulties can be traced to the Supreme Court's decision in Simon v. Eastern
Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization. 17 The majority in Simon denied standing
to indigent seekers of health care who asserted that a Revenue Ruling which
allowed favorable tax treatment to hospitals offering only limited care to indi-
gents encouraged the hospitals tO deny them services and therefore deprived
them of a benefit which Congress intended to confer by the charitable exemp-
tion provision of the Internal Revenue Code. As Justice Brennan pointed out
in his dissent, the Courts emphasis on rigid standards of causation and re-
dressability could have a serious negative impact on suits by individuals whom
Congress intended to benefit by providing such incentives." Many grant
programs fall within this category of incentive legislation, since the recipients
are units of government,'• but the ultimate, albeit indirect, beneficiaries are
citizens of those governments.
This article examines the impact of Simon, and standing doctrine gener-
ally, upon one area of grant litigation: third party law suits challenging
awards of funds under the Housing and Community Development Act of
1974." Since many of the numerous law suits which the community de-
velopment program has generated 2' have been brought by third parties, and
since this litigation coincided with the emergence of a more restrictive ap-
proach to standing enunciated by the Supreme Court in cases such as Simon
and Warth v. Seldin, 22 it is not surprising that standing issues have dominated
many of the community development cases.
Simon was the principal case upon which the Court. of Appeals for the
Second Circuit relied in ultimately denying standing in the celebrated Hartford
litigation." Indeed, shortly after Simon was handed down, a public interest
group warned Congress that the decision would severely restrict community
development suits, and recommended that the Housing and Community De-
velopment Act he amended to grant broad standing."
However,	 other rep(:)rted cases, the federal courts appear ultimately
to have found in favor of the plaintiffs' standing." This string of victories
17 426 U.S. 26 (1976).
" Id. at 61-62 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
' 1 See R. CA	 , RIGHTS AND REMEDIES UN DER FEDERAL. GRANTS, 35-36
(1979) [hereinafter cited as CA1'PALL1].
2 ' 1 42 U.S.C. §§ 5301-5317 (Stipp. II 1978).
21 See cases cited at note 106 infra.
22 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
23 City of Hartford v. Hills. 408 F. Supp. 889 (I). Conn. 1976), affd, City of
Hartford v. Towns of Glastonbury, 561 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1976), rev'd en bane, 561
F.2d 1048 (1977). cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1034 (1978).
24 Community Development Block Grant Program, Hearings Before the Senate Comm.
on Banking, Housing and Urban 'Wears, 94th Cong.. 2d Sess. 368-69, 375 (1976) (state-
mem of Amy Totenberg).
22 NAACP v. Harris, 607 F.2d 514, 525-27 (1st Cir. 1979); Monarch Chem.
Works v. Thone, 604 F.2d 1083 (8th Cir. 1979); Lower Moreland Homeowners Ass'n
v. HUD, 479 F. Stipp, 886, 896 (E.D. Pa. 1979); Coalition for Block Grant Compliance
v. HUD, 450 F. Supp. 43, 51 (E.D. Mich. 1978): Philadelphia Welfare Rights Org. v.
Embry, 438 F. Stipp. 434, 437-38 (E.D. Pa. 1977); NAACP v. Hills, 412 F. Supp. 102,
106 (N.D. Cal. 1976); Knoxville Progressive Christian Coalition v. Testerman, 404 F.
Supp. 783, 788-89 (E.D. Tenn. 1975) (by implication).
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does not mean that. justice Brennan's reservations about Simon were unwar-
ranted. Defendants in community development litigation have relied heavily
upon the decision. In addition, the lower court discussions of standing are
remarkably lacking in clarity. Simon is, at times, virtually ignored, and, at.
other times, distinguished by elaborate and questionable analysis. The article
contends that, properly analyzed, the findings of standing in the community
development cases are quite consistent with Simon. What is needed is a will-
ingness on the part of the lower courts to confront. the Simon issues head on,
and to understand the nature of grant programs and the myriad of interests
they create. The result will do nothing to stein the rise of grant litigation, a
phenomenon whose utility many commentators are calling into question. 2 "
While this concern is legitimate, the answers to the problems generated by
grant litigation should not generally be sought in the doctrine of standing.
I. THE NEW LAW OF STANDING
Since standing constitutes such staple Fare for the authors of law review
articles, one need only summarize the more salient recent developments in
this area. The last decade has seen the emergence of at least two "new" 11vs
of standing propounded by the Supreme Court. Moreover, several recent de-
cisions suggest that the Court has abandoned the second of these approaches
and returned to the first. The first development—hailed by Professor Davis
as the "liberalized law of standing""—arose primarily in the context of chal-
lenges to administrative actions. In the 1970 cases of Association of Data Proces-
sing Service Organizations v. Camp 28
 and Barlow v. Collins, 2" Justice Douglas, for
the Court, rejected the legal interest test, which had previously presented a
serious barrier For plaintiff's seeking non-statutory review of administrative ac-
tion. 31
 The Court limited the standing inquiry to two questions: whether the
plaintiff had suffered injury in fad, and whether the plaintiff was "arguably
within the zone of interest to be protected or regulated by the statute or con-
stitutional guarantee in question." 3 ' In essence, justice Douglas rewrote the
law of standing by reading the words "within the meaning of a relevant stat-
ute" in section 10(a) of the Administrative Procedure Act 32 as referring not. to
the authorization of specific judicial review by an agency's underlying statutes,
but as referring to the cluster of interests furthered or regulated by a given
program created by statute. Thus section I0(a) conferred standing upon any-
one who could be identified as arguably within the ambit of a particular stat-
ute and who was "adversely affected or aggrieved" by agency action.
26
 See, e. , , cotenoerg, Federalism in Transition: 1959-79, 6 INTERGOVERNMENTAL
PERSPECTIVE No. 1, 4. 9 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Stenberg]; CAPPAI. ► .1, Supra note
19, at 168-71 (grantor–grantee disputes).
27 K. DAvis, AnmeusTRArivE LAW OF THE SEVENTIES § 22.00 at 485 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as DAVIS].
28
 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
2" 397 U.S. 159 (1970).
3" Id. at 153. Fur an example of how the legal interest test was used to prevent
judicial review of administrative actions, see Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U.S. 113
(1940).
3 ' Id. at 153.
32 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1976).
March 19801	 COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT LITIGATION	 529
The Court's application of the zone of interests test suggested that it
would be easy to meet.. Furthermore, the 1972 decision of United States v.
Students Challenging Regulatoiy Procedures (SCRAP) 33 seemed a clear signal that
the injury in fact requirement. had been diluted to the level of a "mere
trifle." 34 Commentators viewed the new law of standing as a virtual en-
dorsement by the Supreme Court of the concept of a "public action" brought.
by a "private attorney general." 5 Many of the lower courts apparently con-
curred . 3 "
Epitaphs for the law of standing, however, proved to be somewhat pre-
mature. A series of decisions between 1973 and )976 revived the doctrine into
a formidable obstacle for would-be federal court plaintiffs. The principal
teaching of cases such as Linda R.S. v. Richard D," and Warth v. Seldin" was
the need for a convincing showing at the pleading stage that a judicially cog-
nizable harm to the plaintiff had been caused by the defendant, and that
there was a high degree of probability that a court ruling favorable to the
plaintiff would remedy that harm. These cases arose in the context of con-
stitutional challenges. Simon, by contrast, not only emphasized the importance
of the causation–redressability inquiry, but extended it to challenges of ad-
ministrative action on statutory grounds. Indeed, lower courts seeking to in-
tone the black letter law of standing in administrative law challenges fre-
quently rely on justice Powell's statement in Simon that
when a plaintiff's standing is brought into issue, the relevant inquiry
is whether, assuming justiciability of the claim, the plaintiff has
shown an injury to himself (hat is likely to be redressed by a favora-
ble decision. Absent such a showing, exercise of its power by a fed-
eral court would be gratuitous and thus inconsistent with the article
III limitation.'"
Justice Powell's test, and lower court reliance on it, demonstrate the significant
barrier which plaintiffs challenging administrative action must overcome.
Simon is equally important because it illustrates the significance of the way
in which courts apply the concept of judicially cognizable harm. The Simon
majority saw the harm complained of as the actual denial of hospital services
to the plaintiffs." For justice Brennan and the dissenters, the harm was
injury to a beneficial interest—the plaintiffs' "opportunity and ability" to re-
ceive medical services.' This, in turn, could lead to the "ultimate injury" of
as 412 U.S. 669 (1973).
DAvis„otpra note 27, § 22.2, at 524.
35 Albert, Standing to Challenge Administrative Action: An Inadequate Surrogate for
Claim for Relief 83 YALE L.J. 425, 475-76 (1974) [hereinafter cited as,Albertl.
36 See, e.g., National Automatic Laundry and Cleaning Council v. Shultz, 443
F.2d 689, 693 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (standing has been deprived of "meaningful vitality" by
recent Supreme Court decisions).
37
 410 U.S. 614 (1973).
38 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
a 9
 426 U.S. at 38, quoted in City of Rohnert Park v. Harris, 601 F.2d 1040,
1048 (9th Cir. 1979).
4(' 426 U.S. at 40-41.
41 Id. at 56 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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illness. 42 One implication of the Court's approach is that any time plaintiffs
suffer from a general, ongoing condition, such as poverty or isolation in inner
city ghettos, and that condition is viewed as the ultimate harm of which they
complain, causation and redressability may he exceedingly hard to prove
whatever the defendants are alleged to have done.'"
Lower courts were quick to recognize that, cases such as Worth and Simon
with their new emphasis upon causation and redressability" represented at.
least a "tightening up of pleading requirements" 44 and certainly a retreat.
from the liberal approach of SCRAP. Thus, For example, in American Society of
Travel Agents, Inc. v. Blumenthal, 45 the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit rejected on standing grounds a challenge by private travel
agencies to the favorable tax treatment afforded the American Jewish Con-
gress and other tax-exempt organizations which offered low-cost package
tours to their members. The court relied heavily on Simon in finding, alterna-
tively, that the plaintiffs had not alleged a judicially cognizable injury in fact,
and that., even if they had, there was not sufficient. possibility that the injury
would be redressed by a favorable decision . 4" As to the first ground, the
court cited the plaintiffs' failure to identify specific travelers who would use
their services if the favorable tax treatment. were terminated. The court
viewed the plaintiffs' asserted harm as the "creation of an unfair competitive
atmosphere," and rejected such an injury claim as "too speculative." 47 Alter-
natively, the court reasoned that even if the plaintiffs had alleged sufficient
harm, they had "not demonstrated that they would reap any tangible benefits
if the court were to order the relief sought." The opinion reasoned that non-
profit organizations may . benefit primarily from the use of volunteer labor,
that their members might prefer to travel with them anyway, that they might
shift to more religious or educational tour packages, or that travel by their
members would simply decline. Thus, there was not sufficient likelihood of a
favorable ruling benefiting the plaintiff." Similar restrictive applications of
Simon can be found in numerous other lower court cases.'"
Commentators have generally been outraged by the restrictive Supreme
Court cases and their progeny. This new law of standing has been criticized
from two distinct perspectives. One complaint is simply that the Court is not.
applying standing principles correctly, i.e., liberally. 5 " A second and more
fundamental critique is that the entire concept. of standing should be abati-
" Id. at 61 11.10 (by implication).
4 " See, e.g., City or Hartford v. Towns of Glastonbury, 561 E.2(1 1032, 1047 (2d
Cir. 1976) (Meskill, J., dissenting), rev'd en bane, 561 E.2d 1048 (1977), cert. . denied, 434
U.S. 1034 (1978).
44 American Soc'y of TraveI Agents. inc. v. Blumenthal. 566 F.2d 145, 151-52
n.7 (1).C. Cir. 1977).
43
 566 F.2d 145 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
4 ' Id. at 148, 150.
47 ld. an 149.
an Id. an 149-5 I .
So'. e.g., Iimvker v. Morton, 541 F.2d 1347 (9th Cir. 1976); Forest Hills
Early Learning Center v. Lukhard. 480 F. Stipp. 636 (E. I). Va. 1979).
5°
 E.g„ DAvls, supra note 27, at 168 (Stipp. 1978) (criticizing inconsistency of
liberal and illiberal standing decisions).
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• cloned. Professor Albert, drawing heavily on private law analogies, has
suggested replacing standing with a public law of claims, under which a plain-
tiff's relationship to the statute in question would be treated as part of the
merits, but would be considered prior to the legality of the defendant's con-
d ct.'' •
Since 1977, however, the Court, while not "abandoning" standing, has
qualified substantially the restrictive approach embodied in Warth and Simon.
In Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp.," Jus-
tice Powell emphasized that a plaintiff need not produce a "guarantee" that
cessation of the defendant's conduct would produce the benefits sought. 53
Justice Powell returned to this theme in Regents of University of California v.
Bakke." In response to a challenge to Bakke's standing, Justice Powell stressed
that he would not lack standing even if he could not prove that he would
have been admitted in the absence of the special admissions program at issue
in that case. "The [c]onstitutional element of standing is plaintiff's demonstra-
tion of any injury to himself that is likely to he redressed by favorable decision
of his claim," 55 In Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group'''—a
case which Professor Davis called one of the most liberal standing decisions
ever handed down ''- the Court rejected a nexus test that. would have limited
standing in constitutional cases to plaintiffs who suffer harm to an interest
protected by the constitutional provision they invoke. 58
Most recently, in Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood,''" the Court ap-
peared to move toward Professor Albert's concept of a public law of claims,
postponing until the merits the question whether the plaintiff should be able
to challenge the conduct in question. In Gladstone, individual residents of a
community challenged racial "steering" of prospective home buyers within
that community. Some plaintiffs were residents of the "target community,"
toward which blacks allegedly were steered. The Court rejected the threshold
challenge to their standing that the alleged injury was so diffused as, in real-
ity, to be an injury to society generally." The Court reasoned that change in
the racial climate of a given neighborhood might constitute an injury to those
living in it. The key issues would concern the characteristics of the neighbor-
hood, and the Court stated that such matters "should be ascertainable on the
basis of discrete facts presented at trial.""' The Court also noted that evi-
dence about the general real estate practices of the area and of the defen-
dams might he relevant in establishing the "necessary causal connection be-
tween the alleged conduct and the asserted injury.'' Again, the Court
51 Albert, supra note 35.
52 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
at 261.
" 438 U.S.. 265 (I 978).
Id. at n.14 (Powell, J.) (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
'" 438 U.S. 59 (I 978).
57 Davis, supra note 27, at 168 (Stipp. 1978).
58 Id. at 78.
5"
 441 U.S. 91 (1979).
"" Id. at 112-13.
61 Id. at 114 (footnote omitted).
"2 Id. at 114 n.29.
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stated that these matters should be developed at trial. In all these cases, the
Court has seemed to step back from the strict standing requirements an-
nounced in the mid-1970's.
Nevertheless, Warth and Simon are routinely cited by the Court as the
fundamental cases on the law of standing. There are no indications that they
would be decided differently if they arose today, and they are the principal
influence upon lower court standing decisions. Thus, standing still must be
confronted and overcome by third party plaintiffs in grant-in-aid suits.
II. THE IMPORTANCE OF 'FFIRESHOLD DOCTRINES IN
GRANT-IN-AID LITIGATION
The federal courts have not been uniform in their approach to grant
litigation. Some have embraced it eagerly, in part based on a preference that
federal tribunals adjudicate such disputes." judges who share this view have
been exceedingly lenient in applying threshold doctrines. For example, courts
have found jurisdiction under Section 1337 of Title 28 in cases involving the
National School Lunch Act on the ground that the latter is an "Act of Con-
gress regulating conunerce ...."" 4
Some judges, however, have felt that principles of federalism might dic-
tate a negative attitude toward federal court review of local spending deci-
sions." Such suits contain the potential for "federalizing" large areas of local
government law and thrusting the federal courts deeply into the affairs of
states and localities. Other judges have lamented the complexity of grant dis-
putes, and have suggested strongly that these matters should be resolved by
the administrative rather than the judicial processes. judge Weinfeld, for
example, once began an opinion in a Social Security Act case with the follow-
ing observation: "This is a case that does not belong in this court. It involves
three governmental agencies—federal, state and city—and centers about reg-
ulations so drawn that they have created a Serbonian bog from which the
agencies seemingly are unable to extricate themselves.'
Whatever force these reservations may have had, it is clear that threshold
barriers to grant litigation have weakened, and, in some cases, have toppled
completely." Still, governmental defendants continue to invoke them almost
as a reflex action. Occasionally a plaintiff is tossed out," and the courts'
° E.g., Marquez v. Hardin, 339 F. Supp. 1364, 1370 (N.D. Cal. 1969); cf.
Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 422-23 (1970) (duty of Supreme Court "to resolve
disputes as to whether federal funds allocated to the states are being expended in
consonance with the conditions that Congress has attached to their use.") (Harlan, J,),
64 E.g., Marquez, 339 F. Supp. at 1370-7 i .
"5 Compare McCall v. Shapiro, 416 F.2d 246, 250 (2d Cir. 1969) with Andrews
v. Maher, 525, F.2d 113, 120 (2d Cir. 1975); see Ulster County Community Action
Comm. v. Koenig, 402 F. Supp. 986, 992 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
"I" Feld v. Berger, 424 F. Supp. 1356, 1357 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); see City of
Hartford v. Towns of Glastonbury, 561 F.2d at 1052 (2d Cir. 1977) (en bane) (Kauf-
man, C.J., concurring), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1034 (1978).
67 See generally CAPPALLI, AVIV note 19, at 108-61.
" E.g., City of Rohnert Park v. Harris, 601 F.2d 1040 (9th Cir. 1979).
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analyses have been characterized by one commentator as "marked by consid-
erable confusion, often bordering on incoherence.'"
In order to set the stage for a discussion of standing it will be helpful to
examine briefly two other such doctrines: the existence of an implied right of
action under grant-in-aid statutes and the requirement that a plaintiff meet
the ten thousand dollar amount in controversy requirement of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331.
Both of these obstacles are encountered only in the situation where the
sole defendant is the grantee itself, as opposed to suits against the grantor
agency with the grantee sometimes joined as a defendant. In suits against the
grantor, the Administrative Procedure Act eliminates any right of action prob-
lems," and the 1976 amendments to Section 1331 of Title 28 eliminate any ,
jurisdictional amount problem. 7 1 There are, however, numerous instances in
which a plaintiff might choose to, or have to, sue only the governmental (state
or local) grantee. The extreme case is represented by Angell v. Zinsser, 72 in
which residents of a community sued to enjoin the community from withdraw-
ing an application for Community Development Block Grant funds. More fre-
quent are suits by subgrantees, and suppliers who assert that. the grantee has
violated contractual obligations to them." In other instances, potential ben-
eficiaries of a grant program sue the grantee, rather than the grantor, be-
cause they do not seek to stop the grant. but want the court to issue a direct
order to include them among the beneficiaries of the program. A good
example is the case of Cannon v. University of Chicago." In Cannon the plain-
tiff alleged that the defendant had unlawfully denied her admission. Rather
than suing to terminate funds to the defendant, however, she sought the ben-
efit of admission. 75
In such instances where the sole defendant is the grantee, the plaintiff
may face the obstacles of an implied right. of action and the jurisdictional
amount. Cannon illustrates the potential for overcoming implied right obsta-
cles by liberal application of the so-called "four factor" test of Cort v. Ash. 76
" CAPP ALLA , SliPra note 19, at 109.
" See, e.g., Falzarano v. United States, 607 F.2(1 506 (1st Cir. 1979) (by impli-
cation); Cutler v. Kennedy, 475 F. Stipp. 838, 847 n.22 (D.D.C. 1979). But see Chrysler
Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281. 317 (1979). Damages, however, would not be available
in a suit tinder MeAPA.
7 ' Section 1331(a) now provides for a $I0,000 amount in controversy require-
ment, "except that no such sum or value shall be required in any such action brought
against the United States, any agency thereof, any officer or employee thereof in his
official capacity." 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1976).
72 473 F. Supp. 488 (D. Conn. 1979).
73 E.g.. People's Housing Dev. Corp. v. City of Poughkeepsie, 425 F. Supp.
482 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); el. Ramirez, Leal & Co. v. City Demonstration Agency, 549 IF.2d
97 (9th Cir. 1976) (failure of grantee to follow preference policy expressed in grant
statute).
74 441 U.S. 677.
7S Plaintiff also sought damages, as well as declaratory and injunctive relief. Id.
76 422 U.S. 66 (1975). It should he noted that applications of the concepts of
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The plaintiff asserted that she had been excluded from participation in feder-
ally assisted medical education because of her sex. Such exclusion would un-
questionably violate section 901(A) of Title IX of. the Education Amendments
of 1972, 77
 which provides that "no person in the United States shall, on the
basis of sex, be excluded fn.int participation in, be denied the benefits of, or
be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activities re-
ceiving Federal Financial Assistance ...." The Seventh Circuit upheld a dis-
missal of the complaint on the ground that the plaintiff had no private right
of action under Title I X. 78 The Supreme Court. reversed by a margin of 6 to
3, although two concurring justices expressed grave reservations about the
proliferation of private rights of action under federal statutes.'" The plural-
ity, rather routinely, applied the four factors originally set out in Carl.
The Cort test examines first, whether the plaintiff is one of the primary
beneficiaries of the statute, one upon whom Congress intended to confer
rights; second, the bearing of legislative history; third, the impact of allowing
a private suit on the implementation of the statute; and, fourth, whether the
suit is one which would normally be governed by state law."" It should be
noted, however, that the Cart test arose in the context of federal regulatory
legislation enacted under substantive grants of power such as the comnierce
clause. The routine transferral of the test. to the context of grant programs
enacted under the spending power raises serious questions."'
77
 20 U.S.C.. § 1681 (1976).
7 ' Cannon v. University of Chicago, 559 F.2d 1063, 1077 (7th Cir. 1977).
7 " 441 U.S. at 717-18 (Rehnquist and Stewart, JJ., concurring).
In Cori v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975), the Court developed the "four factor"
test in the following manner:
In determining whether a private remedy is implicit in a statute not ex-
pressly providing one, several factors are relevant. First, is the plaintiff 'one
of die class for whose especial henclit the statute was enacted.' Texas &
Pacific R. Co. 7r. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33, 39, 36 S.( . t. 482, 484, 60 L.F.d. 874
(1916) (emphasis supplied)—that is, does the statute create a federal right
in favor of the plaintiff? Second, is there any indication of legislative in-
tent, explicit or implicit, either to create such a remedy or to deny one?
See, e.g., National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. National Assn. of Railroad Pas-
sengers, 414 U.S. 453, 458, 460, 94 S.Ct. 690, 693, 694 • 38 1.,.Ed.2d 646
(1974) (Amtrak). Third, is it consistent with the underlying purposes of the
legislative scheme to imply such a remedy for the plaintiff? See, e.g., Am-
trak, supra; Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Barbour, 421 U.S. 412, 423,
95 S.Ct. 1733• 1740, 44 1..Ed.2d 263 (1975); Calh000 v. Harvey, 397 U.S.
134, 85 S.Ct. 292, 13 L.E(1.2d 190 (1964). And finally, is the cause of ac-
tion one traditionally relegated to state law, in an area basically the concern
of the States, so that it would be inappropriate to infer a cause of action
based solely on federal law? ... j, I. Case Co. v. Barak, 377 U.S. 426, 434,
1555, 1560, 12 1....Ed.2d 423 (1964); Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal
Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 394-395, 91 S.C1. 1999, 2003-2004, 39
019 (1961); id., at 400, 9! S.Ct. at 2006 (Harlan, J., concurring in
judgment).
Id. at 78, quoted in Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 688 n.9 (1979).
" CAPPALU, supra note 19, at 115-16. Allowing the private suit turns the grant
condition into a coercive norm which the grantee must obey. Under one view of grant
theory, however, the grantee has the option of dropping out of the program, and any
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Perhaps the most serious objection to transferring Curl to the grant con-
text is that the four factor test can lead almost automatically to finding a
private right of action. Since the ultimate beneficiaries of federal grant pro-
grams, and of cross-cutting strings such as anti-discrimination provisions, can
almost. always be identified both from the language of the statute and from its
legislative history, the first factor usually will not be a problem for such plain-
tiffs. The second factor usually yields no evidence one way or the other. Since
federal funds are involved, many judges are quick to assert a federal interest.
This interest is then cited as satisfying the fourth factor, even though in the
case of state and local governmental grantees, the activities assisted may well
involve "an area basically of concern to the State."' At this point the defen-
dant's only hope is to convince the court that the existence of an administra-
tive enforcement mechanism is sufficient to turn the third factor in its favor,
thereby swinging the balance against the plaintiff's successful invocation of
the first and fourth factors. Cannon and a growing number of cases in the
lower courts suggest that beneficiary plaintiffs will usually win the implied
right skirmish, although others may be less successful."
Ironically, the proliferation of implied right cases in the lower courts—
applying the four factor analysis—continues even after the Supreme Court, at
least in the regulatory context, has sharply curtailed use of the Cort test, al-
most. to the point of renouncing it." Plaintiff's may be able to avoid the
obstacles of the implied right of action concept by relying, instead, on Section
1983 of Title 42." This statute provides specifically for suit against "every
person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory, subjects or causes to be subjected any citizen
of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitu-
tion and laws . . . ." 8" Plaintiffs have argued, at times successfully, that, since
the conditions of federal grant statutes are "laws - of the United States, it fol-
lows that governmental (state and local) officials who violate these conditions
are subject to suit under Section 198'3," which thus becomes an express right.
of action against any such violation. The Supreme Court's recent decision in
Maine v. Thiboutot 88 appears to accept this contention.
noncompliance can only be remedied by termination. See id. at 82-85 (limited en-
forcement powers of grantor agency). Moreover, the norm might be one which the
federal government could not impose directly under any of its regulatory powers, thus
raising constitutional questions. See generally Kaden, Politics, Money, and State
Sovereignty: The Judicial Role, 79 CoLum. L. REV. 847, 893-97 (1979).
" Curt v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975).
" Cotnpare Camenish v. University of' Texas, 616 F.2d 127 (5111 Cir. 1980) with
City of Rohnert Park v. Harris, 601 F.2d 1040 (9th Cir. 1979). As indicated, these
individuals may be beneficiaries either of the underlying grant program, or of a na-
tional policy applicable to all or many grant programs.
84 Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 100 S. Ct. 242 (1979);
Touche Russ & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979).
" 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976).
88 Id. (emphasis added).
87 E.g., Blue v. Craig, 505 F.2d 830, 838 (4th Cir. 1974).
" 100 S. Ct. 2502 (1980). The issue is not free from doubt, however. Shortly
before Thiboutot was decided, the Court asked the parties in Pennhurst State School &
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In addition to the obstacles posed by the requirement for an implied
right of action, the problem of the jurisdictional amount must he overcome in
suits against the grantee. The ten thousand dollar amount in controversy re-
quirement can he a difficult barrier to plaintiffs challenging violations of'
grant conditions.'" This may happen if the individual claims are small, and
cannot be aggregated under the doctrine of Synder v. Harris. 9" Chapman v.
Houston Welfare Rights Organization"' is a good example of such a case. The
hurdle may also arise in cases where a large grant is challenged and where the
court does not view the amount of the grant itself as the amount in con-
troversy, but requires individual plaintiffs to show a ten thousand dollar
stake."' In the community development context., one court has refused to
allow the plaintiff to aggregate the dollar amount of a multi-year application,
and insisted on treating each year as a separate "amount in controversy."""
Partly, perhaps largely, because of such threshold obstacles, third party
plaintiffs frequently sue the grantor agency. In these instances, third party
suits against the grantor agency may avoid some barriers,• 4 but they still are
fertile territory for the defense of lack of standing. The defendant's ability to
raise standing issues varies considerably from grant program to grant pro-
gram. Some programs constitute a direct pass-through, with the grantee act-
ing primarily as a disbursing agency." 5 In such a context it is easy to identify
the beneficiaries of the program; their standing to challenge violations will
rarely, if ever, be questioned. Other programs, however, constitute "grants to
governments," as opposed to "grants to people." Obviously, individuals would
be the ultimate beneficiaries of the funds received, but precisely who is to
benefit, and in what way, may present exceedingly complex questions. The
Community Development Block Grant program is an example of grants to
governments. Therefore, it is not surprising that a number of difficult stand-
ing questions have arisen in the numerous cases brought under the Commu-
nity Development Act.
III. THE COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT ACT: AN OVERVIEW
"More legal challenges have been made in the first year of the [Housing
and Community,
 Development. Act] than under the past decade of urban re-
newal and categorical grants."
—Professor Richard Kushner""
Hosp. V. Halderman, cert. granted, 100 S. Ct. 2984 (198(t) to brief the issue of the
applicability of § 1983 io statutory claims.
14" CAPPALLI, Supra note 19, at 149-50. But see Chapman v. Houston Welfare
Rights 01-g., 441 U.S. 600, 675 (1979) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
" 394 U.S. 332, 336 (1969).
" 1
 441 U.S. 600 (1979).
"' E.g., Schreiber v. Lugar, 518 F.2d 1099, 1104-05 (7th Cir. 1975).
"3
 Johnson v. County of Chester, 413 F. Stipp. 1299, 1308-09 (F.D. Pa. 1976).
"4
 The doctrines of primary jurisdiction and exhaustion of remedies are po-
tential barriers in either type of suit. See generally C.:APPALL!, porn mote 19, at. 162-65.
The "welfare-
 programs antler the Social Security Act are a good example.
The grantee may. of course, have substantial responsibilities, such as provision of a
matching share.
"" Kushner, Litigation Strategies am/ Judicial Review Under Title I of the Housing
and Community Development Act of 1974, 1 I URB. L. ANN. 37, 98 (1976).
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A. The Act
Title I of the Housing and Community Development. Act of I974" 7 (Act.)
represented an important change in the federal gram-in-aid system. It con-
solidated seven pre-existing categorical grant programs into a single block
grant (CDBC), with funding allocations determined largely by a formula. As
enacted, this program fell short of the "Special Revenue Sharing" approach
which President Nixon had advocated. Title I, however, did appear to in-
crease substantially local discretion in the use of funds, while cutting back
HUD's authority to second guess grantee choices."'
Congress authorized $11.3 hillion for the first three and one half years.
Eighty percent of the funds were allocated to Standard Metropolitan Statisti-
cal Areas (SMSA's). Most of these funds went to "entitlement communities."
Cities were entitled if they were over 50,000 in population, the central city of
an SMSA, or had participated in the folded-in categorical grants (so-called
"hold harmless" communities). Counties were entitled if they met certain
population criteria and were authorized to engage in community development
activities (so-called "urban counties"). Entitlements were computed primarily
by a formula based on population, overcrowded housing, and poverty. In
1977 the Act was amended to give grantees a choice between this formula and
one based on poverty, age of housing stock, and the grantee's relative rate of
growth."
Local discretion in the use of Community Development funds is not un-
limited. Any expenditure must, fall within the Act's list of eligible activities,'"
and must reflect, with limited exceptions, the priority of benefiting low and
moderate-income persons.'" Projects must be included in the community
development program submitted to HUD as a prerequisite of receiving a
grant, even for "entitlement" communities."' Other strings such as area-
wide planning processes, citizen participation, environmental review, and
anti-discrimination provisions must be complied with. Even so, communities
have considerably more flexibility than under the categorical programs.
Paradoxically, this very flexibility appears to be a principal source of the grow-
ing body of community development. litigation.
97 42 U.S.C. §§ 5301-5317 (Stipp. II 1978).
" ,See Fishman. Tide I of the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974:
New Federal and Local Dynamics in Community Development, 7 URB. L. ANN. 189 (1975).
"" See K eating  and LeGites. Who Should Benefit from the Community Development
Block Grant Program?, 10 U. LAW. 701, 702-04 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Keating
and LeGatesi.
'"" 42 U.S.C. § 5305(a) (Stipp. 11 1978).
""' E.g., 42 U.S.C. §§, 5301(c), 5304(b)(2) (Stipp, 11 1978). The Act's ambiguity
as to whether the permissible alternative imrposes of alleviating slum and blight condi-
tions and meeting "AtrgenC community development needs are equally high priority
has generated considerable controversy. See, e.g., Keating and LeGates, supra note 99,
at 714-20, 730-31; Advocacy Guide, supra note 1, at 618.
112 42 U.S.C. § 5304(a) (Supp. II 1978).
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B. The Volume of Community Development Litigation.
The volume of federal grant litigation—described in 1972 as a "veritable
explosion" 1 " 3 —continues to rise.'" The Community Development Act has
contributed its share of cases; a recent analysis of the program concluded that.
"each year of the CDBC, program has seen an increasing number of cases
brought ...." 105 The analysis presented in this article is based primarily on
those federal cases reported in the National Reporter System. As of January
31, 1980, 'a .search of the Federal Reporter and Federal Supplement yields eight-
een cases involving the Act in more than a peripheral manner.'" These re-
ported decisions, however, represent only the tip of the icebet'g. Some cases
decided at ' the district court level are not reported in the Federal Supplement,
but. can be found in unofficial sources such as the Clearinghouse Review. 107
Other cases, apparently, are not reported anywhere, although their existence
is well known to community development law specialists.'" Of equal impor-
tance is the seemingly large number of suits which never reach the decision
stage, either because they are settled or because action by the community
moots the dispute.'"" Although these cases are not "reported," it is occasion-
ally possible to examine the terms of a settlement. 1 °
C. The Forms of Community Development Litigation—The
Preponderance of Third Party Suits
As indicated in the Introduction, grant litigation can arise in many differ-
ent contexts. The community development cases follow this pattern to a
103 M1CHELmAN AND SANDALOW, supra note 6.
1"4 CAPPALL1, supra note 19, at 1-7.
185
 Advocacy Guide, supra note 1 at 663.
tun
	 v. Harris, 607 F.2d 514 (1st Cir. 1979); Monarch Chem. Works v.
Thone, 604 F.2c1 1083 (8th Cir. 1979); Young v. Harris, 599 F.2c1 870 (8th Cir. 1979);
Goolsby v. Blumenthal, 597 F.2d 934 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 462
(1979); City of Hartford v. Towns of Glastonbury, 561 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1976). rev'd
en bane, 516 F.2d 1048 (1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1034 (1978); Colony Fed. Say. &
Loan Ass'n v. Harris, 482 F. Supp. 296 (W.D. Pa. 1980); Lower Moreland Homeown-
ers Ass'n v. HUD, 479 F. Supp. 886 (ED. Pa. 1979); Angell v. Zinnser, 473 F. Supp.
488 (D. Conn. 1979); Fox v. HUD, 468 F. Supp. 907 (E.D. Pa. 1979); Broaden v.
Harris, 451 F. Supp. 1215 (W.D. Pa. 1978): Town of East Hartford v. Harris, 450 F.
Supp. 512 (D.D.C. 1978); Coalition for Black Grant Compliance v. HUD, 450 F. Supp.
43 (F.D. Mich. 1978); Philadelphia Welfare Rights Org. N. . Embry, 438 F. Supp. 434
(E.D. Pa. 1977); People's Housing Dev. Corp. v. City of Poughkeepsie, 425 F. Supp.
482 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Johnson v. County of Chester, 413 F. Supp. 1299 (E.D. Pa.
1976); NAACP v. Hills, 412 F. Supp. 102 (N.D. Cal. 1976); Knoxville Progressive
Christian Coalition v. Testerman, 404 F. Supp. 783 (E.D. Tenn. 1975); Ulster County
Community Action Comm. v. Koenig, 402 F. Supp. 986 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). This list
includes cases involving the Urban Development Action Grant Program added to Tide
1 in 1977.
117 E.g., NAACP v. Harris, 12 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 915 (D. Mass.), rev'd, 607
F.2ci 514 (1st Cir. 1979).
108 See Advocacy Guide, supra note 1, at 675-77.
"" Id. at 663.
11 " See, e.g., Community Development Block Grant Program, Hearings Before the Senate
Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 262 (1976) (stipula-
tion of settlement, Edison, N.J.)
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degree. Reported decisions include a grantee's challenge of a denial,'" a
sub-grantee's challenge to a refusal to fund its program, 12 neighborhood op-
position to community development, funded projects, 13 and attempts to in-
voke the Uniform Relocation Act."' The Community Development Act has
also spawned a highly unusual genre of lawsuit: challenges by central cities
and their residents to grants to suburban jurisdictions on the ground that the
latter were not meeting the Act's condition that they plan for potential low
and moderate income residents." 5 The most frequent form of community
development suit, however, has been. what might be termed "third party—
alternative use" challenges to communities' applications for funds. The plain-
tiffs in such suits are low and moderate income residents of the applicant
community. They assert that the activities Proposed in the application do not
meet their needs as Congress intended, and that, at least by implication, there
are other potential activities which would meet those needs."'
The provisions of the Housing and Community Development Act furnish
several grounds upon which to attack an application. The Secretary must ap-
prove an applicatibn unless:
1) on the basis of significant facts and data, generally available and
pertaining to community and housing needs and objectives, the Sec-
retary determines that the applicant's description of such needs and
objectives is plainly inconsistent with such facts or data; or
2) on the basis of the application, the Secretary determines that the
activities to be undertaken are plainly inappropriate to meeting the
needs and objectives identified by the applicant pursuant to subsec-
tion (a) of this section; or
3) the Secretary determines that the application does not comply
with the requirements of this title with specific regard to the primary
purposes of principally benefiting persons of low and moderate in-
come or aiding in the prevention or elimination of slums or blight or
meeting other community development needs having a particular
urgency, or other applicable law or proposes activities which are in-
eligible under this title. The Secretary may not disapprove an appli-
cation on the basis that such application addresses any one of the
primary purposes described in paragraph 3 to a greater or lesser
" 1 "Fown of East Hartford v. Harris, 450 F. Supp. 512 (D.D.C. 1978).
12 People's Housing Dev, Corp. v. City of Poughkeepsie, 425 F. Supp. 482
(S.D.N.Y. 1976).
13 Monarch Chem. Works v. Those, 604 F.2d 1083 (8th Cir. 1979).
114 E.g., Young v. Harris, 599 F.2d 870 (8th Cir. 1979) (interpreting 42 U.S.C.
§ 4601 et seq. (1976)).
15 E.g., City of Hartford v. Towns of Glastonbury, 561 F.2d 1032 (2(1 Cir.
1976), rev'd en battc, 561 F.2d 1048 (1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1034 (1978); Coalition
for Block Grant Compliance v. HUD., 450 F. Supp. 43 (E.D. Mich. 1978),
"" Broaden v. Harris, 451 F. Supp. 1215 (W.D. Pa. 1978); Philadelphia Welfare
Rights Org. v. Embry, 438 F. Supp. 434 (E.D. Pa. 1977); NAACP v. Hills, 412 F. Supp.
102 (N.D. Cal. 1976); Knoxville Progressive Christian Coalition v. Testerman, 404 F.
Supp. 783 (E.D. Tenn. 1975); Ulster County Community Action Comm. v. Koenig,
402 F. Supp. 986 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); see Advocacy Guide, supra note I, at 664 ("increase
in filings relating to the issue of targeting CDBG funds to meet low- and moderate-
income needs ....").
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degree than any other, except that such application may be disap-
proved if the Secretary determines that the extent to which a pri-
mary purpose is addressed is plainly inappropriate to meeting the
needs and objectives which arc consistent with the community's ef-
forts to achieve the primary objective of this title."'
Applications have been challenged on the additional grounds of insufficient
citizen participation," 8 insufficient performance under prior grants,'" and
improper environmental reviews) ." The proliferation of third party–
alternative use challenges, however, cannot. be explained simply by the fact
that there are a number of potential legal grounds upon which to bring them.
Rather, one must look to the nature and structure of the program itself to
understand why "who should reap the benefits of the CDBG funds has been
the single most important issue in the history of the program." ' 2 '
D. The Community Development Act as an Incentive to Conflict
Although the Act's unclear language—the term "community develop-
ment." is not defined—and HUD's asserted laxity in enforcing it may have
contributed to the volume of cases, 122 it is clear that the structure of the pro-
gram represents an invitation to intra-community conflicts for funds. The
shift from categorical programs to one block grant results in more involve-
ment of generalist local officials—including city councils—and forces these
officials to make choices.' 23 Citizen participation provisions ensure that
community development funding decisions will be highly visible. These funds
are regarded as "new money," especially in jurisdictions which did not. partici-
pate in the previous categorical programs. Even in those which did partici-
pate, new groups, particularly neighborhood groups excluded from the Model
Cities Program, have emerged as forceful competitors.'" Cambridge, Mas-
sachusetts, for example, was bombarded with citizen proposals totaling $8
million for a program year during which its entitlement was $2.8 million.' 25
According to the Brookings Institution, a principal result of this intense
intra-community competition is an understandable tendency on the part. of
local officials to spread out the funds among as many activities and neighbor-
hoods as possible. 126
" 7 42 U.S.C. § 5304(c) (Supp. II 1978).
"8 E.g., NAACP v. Hills, 412 F. Supp. 102 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
" 9 Broaden v. Harris, 451 F. Supp. 1215 (W.D. Pa. 1978).
1 " Ulster County Community Action Comm. v. Koenig, 402 F. Supp. 986
(S.D.N.Y. 1975).
121
 Advocacy Guide, supra note I, al 616.
122 Keating and LeGates, supra note 99, at 705.
123 p. DOMMEL, R.: NATHAN, S. LIEBSCHUTZ AND M. WRIGHTSON, DECENTRAL-
IZING COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT 198-99 (1978) (Brookings Institution) [hereinafter
cited as DOMMEL
124 Id. at 199.
125 Housing and Community Development Ad of 1977, Hearings Before the Subcomm.
on Housing and Community Development if the House Comm. on Banking, Finance and Urban
Affairs, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 366-67 (statement of James L. Sullivan).
1211
 DOMMEL ET AL., supra note 123.
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E. The Community Development Litigation as a Step in the.
Political Process
As in other instances of competition for governmental benefits, the losers
may end up going to court.' 27
 In the community development competition a
significant group of actors treats the potential for judicial recourse as an im-
portant bargaining chip from the outset. These actors conduct their pre-
application bargaining and trading in a manner calculated to "build a record"
should they lose in the political arena.
The actors referred to are low and moderate income groups and the pub-
lic interest lawyers who advise them. The Advocacy Guide cited frequently in
this article makes it clear that lawsuits arc to be viewed as one element in an
overall political strategy. 128 Other important steps include active involvement
in public hearings and other citizen participation vehicles, offering specific
proposals of their own, and filing complaints with HUD if unsuccessful. The
willingness of these groups to bring suit—potentially blocking the communi-
ty's funding, or at least creating uncertainty over its release—is a powerful
form of political leverage. Of course, if a challenge to their standing barred
the courthouse door, this leverage would be reduced substantially.
IV. STANDING ISSUES IN THE COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT LITIGATION
A. Intra-Community Challenges—Entitlement Jurisdictions
Third party–alternative use plaintiffs have encountered standing chal-
lenges. The reported standing cases all appear to have involved entitlement
jurisdictions—communities which had a right to a set amount of funds, con-
tingent upon submission of an acceptable application.' 29
 On the surface, at
least, Simon might pose serious obstacles to such infra-community challenges.
Viewed as a tax expenditure, the statute involved in that case represented a
set of incentives to third parties to help the plaintiff beneficiaries. The Com-
munity Development Block Grant Program is similar: funds go to a third
party (the grantee); they are not passed automatically through to the ultimate
beneficiaries as is the case with income transfer programs.'" Thus, under
post-Simon standing doctrine, the effect of a successful suit upon the grantee's
conduct must be considered at the pleading stage. Might the grantee simply
forego a portion of its entitlement if the challenged activity is eliminated?
How substantial is the likelihood that knocking out that activity will lead to the
substitution of others which will, or might, benefit plaintiffs? For that matter,
are courts equipped to engage in the complex task of identifying the ben-
eficiaries of municipal expenditure programs? 131
127 E.g., Scanwcll Laboratories v. Shaffer, 424 F.2d 859 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (disap-
pointed bidder for government contract).
128 Advocacy Guide, supra note 1, at 640-41.
129
 All five of the communities involved in the cases cited at note 116 supra are
listed as having a direct entitlement in HUD's Directory of Allocations for Fiscal Year
1977 (on file with the author).
130
 Under sonic types of CD funded housing rehabilitation programs the funds
will end up in the beneficiaries' hands.
11 See Stenberg, supra note 26.
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Despite the potential obstacles posed by Simon, analysis of the cases leads
to the conclusion that standing is "easily found" in such situations.'" The
lower courts have, essentially, refused to confront the questions raised above.
For example, in Knoxville Progressive Christian Coalition v. Testerman," 3 plain-
tiffs challenged the eligibility of a portion of the city's application involving
the acquisition and improvement of property and a feasibility study for the
1980 World's Fair. Defendants, relying on Warth, argued that plaintiffs had
not shown the requisite likelihood of benefit from judicial relief, since "the
funds involved might be used for eligible projects other than plaintiffs'
neighborhoods." 134 The court admitted that this contention presented a
"difficult issue," but was troubled by its implications, namely that "it would be
difficult to imagine any low or middle income plaintiff with standing to chal-
lenge alleged improper allocations of funds under the Community Develop-
ment Act." 135 Rather than grapple with this issue, the court sidestepped it by
holding that the controversy was not ripe, and, alternatively, that the activities
were eligible.' 36 Similarly, the court in NAACP–Santa Rosa–Sonoma County
Branch v. Hills ' 37 found that low and moderate income plaintiffs would ben-
efit from judicial invalidation of all or a portion of the grantee's application
by presuming that "a favorable ruling might make Title I funds available for
potential rehabilitation of their homes or acquisition of real property on which
loW-cost housing could then be constructed."'" Finally, in Philadelphia Wel-
fare Rights Organization v. Embry, 1 ' 9 the court disposed of a challenge to third
party–alternative use plaintiffs' standing by declaring that "the plaintiffs are
not dependent upon the acts of third parties to alleviate the harm to them.
The reallocation of Title I funds to benefit low income people will directly
result in an increase in the availability of housing units for low income
people. " 140 The court's assertion in Embry does not recognize that under
traditional grant-in-aid theory, the court could not order any re-allocation. 14 '
A judicial decree might invalidate an existing application, but only the
grantee—a "third party," as that term was used—could decide whether and
how to amend it. The Embry court was able to distinguish Simon largely by
dint of this misperception of the federal grant-in-aid system.' 42
132 Advocacy Guide, supra note 1, at 666.
133 404 F. Supp. 782 (E.I). Tenn. 1975).
134
 Id. at 788.
135
 Id. (emphasis in original).
' 3 " Id. at 788-90.
137 412 F. Supp. 102 (Ni). Cal. 1976),
1 "' Id. at 106 (emphasis added).
' 3 " 438 F. Supp. 434 (EA/ Pa. 1977).
14" Id. at 438 (citation omitted) (emphasis added). Standing was not discussed in
the Broaden and Ulster County cases. Those courts which did consider standing focused
primarily on injury in fact problems, rather than on the additional requirement that
plaintiff meet the "zone of interests" test. It is clear that this requirement is not a
serious obstacle in the circumstances under consideration. See id. at 437.
141 See, e.g., PAAC v. Rizzo, 502 F.2d 306, 313-14 (3d Cir. 1975). It should also
be noted that, with limited exceptions, new housing is not an eligible activity under
Title I. Advocacy Guide, supra note I, at 616.
142 Such misperceptions are not limited to the community development area. A
panel of the Fifth Circuit held that revenue sharing funds were subject to the Uniform
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One way to distinguish Simon might be to focus on the fact that it was a
tax case, not necessarily applicable in the grant context. Simon could be read
as establishing a narrow, prudential rule concerning third parties' standing to
challenge the tax liability of others: 43 Justice Stewart's concurring
opinion—which supplied the fifth vote in Simon—supports such a read-
ing.144 Stewart asserted that he could imagine no case, outside of the First
Amendment area, "where a person whose own tax liability was not affected
ever could have standing to litigate the federal tax liability of someone
else." 195
A more helpful analysis of Simon is offered by Chief Judge Bazelon in his
dissent in American Society of Travel Agents v. Blumenthal.'" In Simon, he
points out., "there was no way of knowing in advance whether the increased
income from charitable contributions would exceed the increased cost of pro-
viding additional services." 147 Thus hospital behavior could not be predicted.,
In the community development context it is known precisely how much
money is available to an entitlement community, and there is substantial
likelihood that local officials will wish to retain those funds rather than be
portrayed as having "lost" federal dollars. Thus the challengers can he seen as
analogous to traditional opportunity plaintiffs, such as competitors for a
grant. 14 " It is true that these plaintiffs arc indirect opportunity plaintiffs
since they do not seek the actual funds, but the benefit from their expendi-
ture. In some cases, such as housing rehabilitation programs, it is possible to
identify the beneficiaries in advance. In other cases courts might apply a "rule
of reason" that expenditures in a given area do, in fact, benefit the residents
of that area. This approach to finding benefit to the plaintiffs is similar to
that used in studies of the effects of the community development program.
The remaining question is whether there exist proposals for alternative
uses of the funds which might he included if plaintiffs are successful and
which show a likelihood of benefiting them. In the rare case where there is no
such proposal—if, for example, plaintiffs simply are motivated by a general
opposition to "downtown" projects—standing should be denied. The plaintiffs
have an insufficient relationship to the funds at issue in the suit. In most
Relocation Act, despite the fact that revenue sharing is far different from the categori-
cal grants which dominated the aid system when the URA was enacted. Goolsby v.
Blumenthal. 581 F.2d 455 (5th Cir. 1978), mid en bane:, 590 F.2d 1369 (1979), cert.
denied, 100 S. Ct. 462 (I 979).
143 Cf. American Soc'y of Travel Agents, Inc. v. Blumenthal, 566 F.2d 145, 150
n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (no need to reach tax challenge standing - where "injury in fact"
prerequisite not met).
144 426 U.S. at 47 (1976) (Stewart., J. concurring). Nevertheless, it is questiona-
ble whether a meaningful difference can be drawn in this context between tax expen-
ditures and appropriations expenditures.
' 45 Id.
146 566 F.2c1 145 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
147 Id. at 159 (dissenting opinion).
14" E.g., City of Newburgh v. Richardson, 435 F. Stipp. 1049 (S.D.N.Y. 1977);
See CAPPALLI, Stipra note 19, at 118-23.
II " E.g., R. NATHAN, P. DommEL, S. LI EBSCHUTZ AND M. MORRIS, BLOCK GRANTS
FOR COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT 305-06 (1977) (Brookings Institution).
149
544	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW 	 [Vol. 21:525
cases, however, such proposals will exist, perhaps submitted by the plaintiffs.
As indicated above, the third party–alternative use plaintiffs are likely to have
participated in the application process from the outset.'"
The hard case would arise if the community made a plausible showing
that the plaintiffs stood no chance to benefit since there were other proposals
which it would substitute if the suit were successful, and that these proposed
activities were not those which plaintiffs sought to have funded. The com-
munity might, for example, have used a scoring system—a common device in
the grant contexi.' 5 ' Putting aside the question whether such an inquiry is
best made at the pleading stage,' ." what should a court do if the applicant
demonstrates that plaintiffs' proposal ranked last and has virtually no chance
of ever being funded?
Plaintiffs might attempt to derive support from City of Newburgh v.
Richardson.'" Even though Newburgh ranked 1,169 out of 1,379 New York
applicants for a pool of federal public works funds, the court upheld its stand-
ing to challenge denial of its application.' 54 Newburgh, however, was seeking
to overturn the entire ranking system, including the statistics and computations
utilized by the grantor agency. Thus the case does not provide support fin.
community development plaintiffs challenging, say, ineligible activities, if the
applicant. makes a convincing showing that their proposals have virtually no
chance of being funded. Under traditional standing doctrine, these hypotheti-
cal third party–alternative use plaintiffs appear to be out of luck.'"
In sum, the inn-a-community alternative use cases appear to be one area
where standing need not be an irrelevant encumbrance. If the issues posed by
' 5 " Sec text at note 128 supra. A possible objection to this analysis is that it may
convert opportunities for citizen participation, including the submission of proposals, 42
U.S.C. § 5304(a)(6)(A) (Stipp. I1 1978), into a regnirement that this procedure be
exhausted. It is not necessary ;
 however. that plaintiff's have suggested the alternative
use. only that the possibility exist.
See. e.g., Massachusetts Dept of Correction v. LEAA. 605 F.2(1 21 (1st Cir.
1979).
152 See generally Albert, supra note 35.
15 :1 435 F. Stipp, 1049 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
Id. at 1054-56.
15'1 See CAPPALL1„thPra note 19, at 121. Nonetheless, a court could allow their
suit to proceed by recognizing what might be called "leverage standing." The suit is
only one part of an overall strategy for success in the local bargaining process over
community development funds. If it is known in the outset of that process that any
group which has submitted a proposal will be able, if unsuccessful, to challenge the
ultimate application in federal court, the leverage of such groups is increased. Thus
they are better off, not because of any potential outcome of the suit, but because of
the ability to bring it.. The plaintiffs' harm is their weakness in bargaining with the
defendants; it is redressed by giving them the added leverage of ability to sue.
Perhaps the shift away from int:us on the immediate outcome of the suit cannot be
squared with the policies embodied in the "case and controversy requirement. The
concept of leverage standing can be criticized as essentially circular, After all, accord-
ing "public citizens" standing to challenge any illegal practice in court would increase
the seriousness with which their initial objections are received out of court as well.
Even though the leverage plaintiffs are not just private attorneys general, but. com-
petitors for a hind, granting them standing turns the suit into a forth of blackmail
which threatens the achievement of progratit goals for the community as a whole.
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Simon are squarely faced, the doctrine can perform a reasonably good job of
screening out those with no real interest in the subject matter of the suit. In
more complex community development litigation, however, standing issues
can be troublesome indeed.
B. Intra-Community Challenges—Litigation as the Pathway
to Metropolitan Cooperation?
One of the most complex forms of community development litigation has
been actions by central cities and low and moderate income citizens thereof to
enjoin HUD from awarding community development funds to nearby sub-
urbs."'" Plaintiffs in these cases do not attack the activities proposed in the
application. Rather, they assert that the suburb has not fulfilled a condition of
the Act that requires that the applicant file an adequate Housing Assistance
Plan. One of the components of this plan is an estimate of the number of low
and moderate income persons "expected to reside" there in the future.'"
Plaintiffs assert that this component is missing or inaccurate.
Many proponents of metropolitan integration view the Housing Assis-
tance Plan–expected to reside (HAP-ETR) mechanism as a potentially impor-
tant new weapon in the effort to breach the walls of "fortress suburbia." 158 If
suburbs are to benefit from federal funds for such desired activities as recrea-
tional projects, they must, as a quid pro quo, confront seriously the issue of
meeting their "fair share" of housing low and moderate income persons
within their metropolitan area. Identifying that share and drawing up plans to
meet it are important first steps. Thus federal incentives toward the achieve-
ment of metropolitan equity join the arsenal of coercive measures such as
constitutional and statutory provisions.
Whether the HAP-ETR mechanism produces more than pious pledges
depends largely on the strictness with which HUD enforces it. There is virtual
unanimity among observers of the community development program that, at
least at the outset, HUD required little if any compliance with the ETR provi-
sion.' 5" Some critics charge that the Nixon-Ford administration ran the pro-
gram as if Congress had enacted "Special Revenue Sharing" for community
development instead of a block grant."') In its defense HUD asserted, not
without justification, that the ETR concept was novel, and that many com-
munities simply could not come up with the data."' These statements did
little to mute the intense criticism levelled at HUD's enforcement of the
E.g., City of Hartford v. Towns of Glastonbury, 561 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir.
1976), rev'd en bane, 561 F.2d 1048 (1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1034 (1979); Coalition
for Block Grant Compliance v. HUD, 450 F. Supp. 43 (ED. Mich. 1978).
' 57 42 U.S.C, § 5304(0(4)(A) (Stipp. II 1978).
''" See Advocacy Guide, supra note 1, at 635.
15" ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, COMMUNiTY DE-
VELOPMENT: THE WORKINGS OF A FEDERAL-LOCAL BLOCK GRANT 37-38 (1977).
'"° See, e.g., Advocacy Guide, supra note 1, at 61 l.
"' Community Development Block Grant Program, Hearings Before the Senate Comm.
on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 94th Cong.. 2d Sess. 490, 496 (1976) (statement
of Assistant Secretary David 0. Meeker. jr.).
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HAP-ETR mechanism. Critics took their case not only to Congress, but to the
federal courts as well.
1. The Central City as Plaintiff—Parens Patriae in Disguise?
The most discussed community development case is City of Hartford v.
Towns of Glastonbury." Hartford is the central city of a Standard Metropoli-
tan Statistical Area. In many respects its situation is typical of the nation's
fiscally stressed, older central cities. In particular, Hartford contains a dramat-
ically higher proportion of low and moderate income persons and minorities
than its surrounding suburbs. In 1975, Hartford, city officials and two low-
income residents sued to prevent seven of these suburbs from receiving or
expending community development funds on the ground that they had sub-
mitted improper applications. Plaintiffs attacked the ETR figures in the appli-
cations as inaccurate or omitted entirely. A decision on the merits in plaintiffs'
favor was affirmed by a divided panel of the Second Circuit.'" On rehear-
ing en banc, however, the court of appeals held that the plaintiffs lacked
standing to bring the suit.'"
Standing had been hotly contested at all stages of the suit. The previous
opinion had upheld the standing of the city and the individual plaintiffs,
while dismissing the city officials. Judge Oakes, for the panel, reasoned that
HUD's approval had injured Hartford in two ways. First, if suburban applica-
tions were denied, it would be in a strong position to compete for re-allocated
funds.'" Alternatively, if the defendants complied by submitting accurate
figures, Hartford would be "the direct beneficiary of spatial deconcentration
efforts by its suburbs ...." "" Thus any favorable outcome would benefit
Hartford and redress the dual harm of loss of opportunity to compete and
absence of suburban cooperation.
As for the individual plaintiffs, Judge Oakes recognized that it was some-
what more difficult to identify any injury which they had suffered. Nonethe-
less, he reasoned that HAPs "were intended to lead to greater low income
housing opportunities on •a deconcentrated, regional basis ...," " 7 and that,
presumably, plaintiffs would take advantage of such opportunities if they
arose.'" Additionally, the individual plaintiffs stood to gain from any re-
allocation of funds to Hartford, since it would have to use funds for the ben-
efit of low and moderate income persons.'"
'' 561 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1976), rev'd en bane, 561 F.2c1 1048 (1977), cert. de-
nied, 434 U.S. 1034 (1978).
153 561 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1977), affg City of Hartford v. Hills, 408 F. Supp.
889 (D. Conn. 1976).
' 64 56! F.2d at 1048.
165 Id. at 1037-38.
166 Id. at 1039.
167 Id. at 1040.
168 nint (by implication). The individual plaintiffs' interest in securing suburban
housing does not appear to have been asserted as specifically as was the case, for
example, in Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp.,
429 U.S. 252, 264 (1977).
'" 561 F.2d at 1040. This analysis involves a good deal of speculation. Hartford
might, for example, use additional funds to eliminate slums or blight without any con-
ceivable benefit to plaintiffs.
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Relying heavily on Simon, Judge Meskill, who also wrote the plurality
opinion in the en banc reversal, dissented. As for the city, he determined that
any injury based on loss of opportunity to compete for re-allocated funds was
far too speculative since Hartford had "failed to prove that the intervention of
the federal courts will result in the availability of funds for re-allocation,', 170
If the towns revised their application to comply with the HAP-ETR
mechanism, Hartford would get nothing.
The key to Judge Meskill's analysis is his conclusion that the city would
derive no benefit front such compliance. Despite Hartford's alternative as-
serted harm—municipal overburden, or a "bleak" housing situation—judge
Meskill determined that Simon compelled a denial of standing. It could not
"fairly be said" that HUD's approval of the grants had caused this condition.
Moreover, the possibility that better ETR figures would redress the harm was
remote and speculative."' Alternatively, Judge Meskill argued that the re-
strictions on parens patriae suits limited Hartford to asserting only "its own
proprietary rights ...." " 2 A general interest in improving its housing condi-
tions, thereby enhancing "the social and economic well-being of the citizenry"
was not such a right.'"
As for the individual plaintiffs, Judge Meskill treated their injury as that
of being "trapped in a slum." ' 74 Again, Simon blocked their path. HUD's
assertedly wrongful approval of the suburban applications neither caused nor
worsened this situation. At first, the opinion seemed to suggest that a showing
that HUD's action only left matters the same would not be sufficient to confer
standing. 175 This application of standing is disturbing in a case like Hartford,
since the statute which plaintiffs invoked was designed not to leave things the
way they were. Judge Meskill, however, then applied the redressability com-
ponent of Simon and concluded that "it is naive to imagine that plaintiffs' lot
will be perceptibly improved merely by coercing the defendant towns into
including accurate 'expected to reside' figures in their Block Grant applica-
tions ...." 17" Housing problems in the metropolitan area are massive and
complex, and the impact, if any, of ETRs on those problems is unknown.
Thus, plaintiffs failed to satisfy the Simon criterion of "substantial likelihood"
that a favorable decree would result in securing the benefit of better housing.
Judge Meskill's brief opinion for the en banc plurality is essentially a re-
statement of his dissent. Treating all plaintiffs together, he emphasized the
Simon obstacle that plaintiffs could not show a likelihood that their injury
would be redressed by the court's action. Altering the suburbs' ETR figures
"would have no greater impact on the number of future residents than a
modification of tomorrow's weather forecast would have on tomorrow's
weather." 177 Since plaintiffs lacked standing, the suit was ultimately dis-
missed without consideration of the merits.
:7701	 at 1046.




"6 Id. at 1048.
177 Id. at 1051.
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The standing issues presented in Hartford are among the most difficult
of any of the community development cases. The eleven federal judges who
passed on the issue split six to five. The city's standing will be considered first,
since it is more clearly established than that of the individual plaintiffs. The
parens palriae objection that the city could not bring the action since it was not
asserting its own property interest is of little force. Hartford was not asserting
a mere general interest in "the social and economic well-being of the
citizenry." If viewed as a potential competitor for funds its standing is some-
what similar to that of municipalities and other grantees denied funds.'" The
alternative harm—continued municipal overburden due to suburban failure
to address the concentration of service dependent populations—can be
analogized to environmental damage. Cities have standing to challenge the
infliction of environmental harm.' 79 Pollution affects not only the residents,
but is also a potential drain on the city's fiscal resources given the increased
expenditures for cleaning up and other service demands. Likewise, the pres-
ence of a large service dependent population and an eroding physical plant
increases the pressure on municipal fiscal resources—a fact which Congress
has recognized in the formula for awarding Community Development Block
Grant funds.' 8° Obviously, there can be no bright line drawn between a city's
interests and that of its residents, since improving the former's financial con-
dition by lessening expenditure pressures may benefit the latter through
lower taxation. Still, to the extent that communities can ever bring suit in
federal court, Hartford is asserting injury to itself qua governmental entity.
The real question is not whose injuries are asserted, but whether the com-
plaint meets the requirements of post-Simon standing doctrine."'
Of the city's two arguments in favor of standing, the potential re-
allocation of the funds seems the weaker. It is true that unsuccessful com-
petitors for grants, including governmental units, frequently have been held
to have standing to challenge grant award decisions.' 82 In such cases an at-
tack on a competitor's eligibility is at least implicit since the relief sought in-
volves knocking someone else out of the race, assuming there arc not enough
funds to satisfy all applicants. Hartford, by contrast, may well get judicial re-
lief which solidifies its competitors' position. Even if the court agrees with the
plaintiff, defendants have only to submit satisfactory ETR figures. After this
act of compliance there would he no funds to re-allocate, and no opportunity
for plaintiff to compete for them. Winning amounts to losing. Since the sub-
178
 E.g., City of Newburgh v. Richardson, 435 F. Supp. 1049 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
But see CAPPALLI, supra note 19, at 145-46.
179 E.g., City of Rochester v. United States Postal Service, 541 F.2d 967, 972 (2d
Cir. 1977): Township of Long Beach v. City of New York, 445 F. Supp. 1203, 1213-19
(D.N.J. 1978).
"" Among the factors utilized in the revised formula for the distribution of
funds to entitlement. communities are extent of poverty and age of housing stock. 42
U.S.C. § 5305(b) (Supp. II 1978). Age of housing serves as a proxy for determining
the age of the city's infrastructure in general.
HO This article leaves open any questions of whether or not to discard the doc-
trine of standing altogether.
1 " E.g., City of Newburgh v. Richardson, 435 F. Supp. 1049 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
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urbs have demonstrated that they want the funds by applying for them, it is
understandable that a court might be reluctant to speculate on whether they
will now forego the grants.
Hartford, however, ought to have standing on the ground that it would
benefit from what it asked for: more cooperation from its suburbs in planning
for the housing needs of its low and moderate income residents. Again, there
is the potential speculation whether the suburbs will comply with any court
decree or simply forego the funds. Still the case is not like Simon in that there
is "no way of knowing." Given localities' strong desire for federal funds in
general 183 and the fact that these particular suburbs have already gone
through the difficult process of preparing applications, a strong argument can
be made that there is a "substantial likelihood" that they will alter what is,
after all, a somewhat tangential component of the application.
In any event, this initial speculation was not what compelled Judge ?Vies-
kill to deny standing on the basis of Simon. He refused to accept the argument
that more accurate ETR figures would ameliorate Hartford's burden as a
central city. Hartford presents a close parallel to one of the main issues in
Simon: how to characterize the injury. The Simon majority approach would
appear to require that Hartford First show specific acts by its suburbs which
harmed it in a judicially cognizable way—similar to the denials of medical
services—and then satisfy causation and redressability requirements. Of
course, the city could not do so. Its situation is analogous to that outlined by
Justice Brennan: an "ultimate injury" (municipal overburden), and an im-
mediate injury to an "opportunity and ability" to have that injury lessened.
On the surface, Judge Meskill's invocation of Simon seems correct. There are,
however, two critical distinctions between the community development context
and the tax expenditures involved in Simon.
The first point to recognize is that awarding grants to suburbs which do
not take steps to address the problem of metropolitan equity may hurt central
cities by compounding municipal overburden. Community development funds
are likely to support activities which make suburbs more attractive to upper
income persons and to industries. These effects; in turn, further weaken the
central city's tax base. Moreover, since community development funds require
no local match, the suburbs can undertake the activities without raising their
own taxes. This too enhances their attractiveness and competitive position vis
a vis the central city. By contrast, the mere fact. of the tax expenditures in
Simon did not make the plaintiffs any sicker than they already were. Given
that grants to suburbs may hurt central cities, Congress has attempted to in-
troduce a compensating balance. The HAP -ETR mechanism extracts a form
of promise that the suburbs will undertake to ease the cities' burden. For a
court to say that the promise is meaningless raises serious questions of judicial
deference to legislative fact finding.
The issue of judicial deference brings out a second distinction between
the Hartford and Simon contexts: the CoMmunity Development Act represents
a far more detailed attempt to produce specific benefits for identifiable classes
"a The desire for, and dependence on, federal funds may increase as lax and
expenditure limitations reduce the availability of own source revenues.
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than does the general language of section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue
Code. The Act declares as its primary objective "the development of viable
urban communities, by providing decent housing and a suitable living envi-
ronment and expanding economic opportunities, principally for persons of
low and moderate income."'" Among the specific objectives which further
the overall goal of viable urban communities is "[t]he reduction of the isola-
tion of income groups within communities and geographical areas and the
promotion of an increase in the diversity and vitality of neighborhoods
through the spatial &concentration of housing opportunities for persons of
lower income ...." ' 85 Thus, as the dissenting judges argued in Hartford,
inducing suburbs to address the problem of metropolitan equity represents an
interest on the part of central cities (and their residents) created by statute.' 8 "
The central question in evaluating Hartford is whether it was proper fir
the majority to second guess Congress by dismissing the possibility of benefit
to central cities as a mere "legislative expectation." 187 It has been argued that
a federal court lacks the power to undertake such an inquiry."' The Su-
preme Court, on the other hand, has indicated that Article III places some
limitations on Congress' power to create new interests.'"" Perhaps the in-
terest must be something more than the ability to bring a lawsuit.'" There is
judicial authority for the proposition that areawide planning—hardly an in-
terest recognized at common law—can be a legitimate beneficial interest for
governmental units."' Moreover, the HAP is not the housing equivalent of a
weather forecast. The analogy is faulty since a community has considerably
more control over its housing mix than a forecaster has over the weather. In
any event, although the standing of central cities to bring actions to enforce
the purpose of the HAP is uncertain, the prospect of central cities as litigators
in the quest for metropolitan equity raises interesting possibilities. Hartford
represents a serious roadblock to such initiatives.
2. Low and Moderate Income Plaintiffs—Reverse Parens Patriae?
In his en bane dissent, judge Oakes relied only on the city's standing. His
earlier suggestion that the individual plaintiffs would benefit from any re-
allocation seems a questionable form of reverse parens patriae standing.
Hartford's interest in applying for federal funds is one which should be as-
serted by the city itself, not by citizens."' Moreover, any form of municipal
overburden harm, such as grants to suburbs which ignore metropolitan equity
184 42 U.S.C. § 5301(c) (Stipp. II 1978).
185
 42 U.S.C. § 5301(c)(6) (Supp. 11 1978).
`" 561 F.2d at 1057 (2d Cir. 1977) (Oakes, J., dissenting).
1 " 561 F.2d at 1048 n.5 (Meskill, J., dissenting).
' 8 B Warren, The Housing and Community Development Act Two Years After Hartford,
30 An. L. REv. 549, 557 (1978). But see Note, Standing to Challenge Federal Agency Ac-
tions: City of Hartford v. Town of Glastonbury, 52 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 225, 236 (1978).
"B Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41 n.22
(1976).
1 " See Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346 (1911).
" 1 Texas v. United States, 426 F. Stipp. 74, 77 (W.D. Tex. 1976).
182 See Lewis v. Richardson, 428 F. Supp. 1164, 1166 n.2 (D. Mass. 1977).
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issues, represents an injury to Hartford which it should seek to redress.
Nonetheless, Congress intended the Community Development Act to benefit
people as well as governments, even though it is the latter which receive the
funds."3 Thus, the Act may confer new interests upon low and moderate
income persons, interests which will suffice to uphold their standing when
challenging asserted violations. Can the possibility of suburban planning for
low and moderate income housing fairly be characterized as such an interest?
The District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan answered this
question in the affirmative in Coalition for Block Grant Compliance v. HUD.'"
On similar facts, the court rejected the Hartford holding. In the language of
Congress, the HAP alone is a benefit to these plaintiffs, and we are not willing
to look beyond that Congressional decision to hold that plaintiffs are not really
benefited by the HAP." 1"5 The Coalition court avoided any Simon problems
simply by not discussing them. The most straightforward way of overcoming
the Simon roadblock, however, would have been to rely on the statutory ben-
efit analysis outlined above in dealing with the standing of communities. Un-
like the central city, its km and moderate income residents cannot' argue that
the mere fact of the grant harms them. On the other hand, the numerous
references to low and moderate income persons make clear that Congress
intended them to be the primary beneficiaries of the statutory scheme.'" One
of the particular benefits which they are to receive is "the spatial deconcentra-
tion of housing opportunities...." "7 Thus, it can be argued that Congress
conferred upon low (and moderate?) income 198 central city residents an in-
terest in having their housing needs planned for by any suburb receiving
community development funds.'•
The question remains which central city residents can assert this interest
in a suit against a non-complying suburb. The most obvious plaintiffs are
those who wish to leave the city and who have some connection with the sub-
urb, such as employment. Congress has deemed that having this desire
planned for will help bring about its fulfillment, and that decision by Con-
gress represents the creation of an interest which is more than simply the
ability to bring a suit. Because of the precision with which Congress dealt with
metropolitan housing needs—establishing planning for them as a non-
193 For an excellent discussion of the problem created by the fact that grant
program may "aid" both the grantee entity and ultimate individual beneficiaries, see
CAPPALLI, supra note 19, at 35-36.
194 450 F. Supp. 43 (E.D. Mich. 1978).
195 Id. at 51 (emphasis in original).
"6 E.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 5301(c), 5304(a)(2), 5304(c)(3) (Stipp. 11 1978). However,
activities which do not benefit low and moderate income persons are eligible if they
eliminate slums or blight or meet "other community development needs having a par-
ticular urgency 	 " 42 U.S.C. § 5304(c)(3) (Supp. 11 1978). See note 101 supra.
'" 42 U.S.C 	 § 5301(c)(6) (Stipp. 11 1978).
198 Both the reference to deconcentration and the description of the housing
assistance plan's "expected to reside" component refer only to low income persons.
19" The Coalition court made it clear that plaintiffs' harm was not their inability
to live in Livonia, but rather Livonia's failure to plan for their needs and HUD's ac-
quiescence in that failure. 450 F. Stipp. at 51. This analysis is similar to justice Bren-
nan's characterization of the harm in Simon.
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waivable condition of community development applications—courts can, and
should, defer to the congressional finding that there is a substantial likelihood
that such planning will redress the harm of lack of "spatial deconcentration of
housing opportunities."
C. Intra-Community Non-Entitlement Challenges
Though standing may be "easily found" in the context of alternative use
challenges to entitlement communities' grants, the issue is far more complex if
the community is applying for discretionary funds. There is no assurance the
community will get any funds at all, and the proposed activity challenged by
the plaintiffs may well be the only one for which the applicant wants federal
funds. Plaintiffs' harm thus becomes more difficult to identify, as does the
benefit to them of an order blocking benefits to their community. Although
this question does not appear to have arisen in any of the reported cases
involving the basic community development program, standing has played a
major role in a challenge to a HUD grant under the related Urban Develop-
ment Action Grant program (UDAG). 200
The UDAG program authorizes grants "to severely distressed cities and
urban counties to help alleviate physical and economic deterioration through
reclamation of neighborhoods having excessive housing abandonment or de-
terioration, and through community revitalization in areas with population
outmigration or a stagnating or declining tax base.', 201 The statute em-
phasizes the importance of using federal dollars to attract or "leverage" pri-
vate sector funding. Many UDAG projects resemble the large, downtown
projects that characterized urban renewal in the 1950's and 1960's. The pro-
gram represents a return to the discretionary, categorized approach of federal
community development efforts prior to passage of the Housing and Com-
munity Development Act.
Boston, renowned for its grantsmanship under the old urban renewal
program, sought to take advantage of UDAG by submitting applications for
funds to assist four projects, primarily industrial and commercial. The Na-
tional Association for the Advancement of Colored People, Boston Branch,
and a group of minority plaintiffs sued HUD to enjoin funding of the proj-
ects. They argued in NAACP v. Harris 202
 that Boston's proven history of racial
discrimination and lack of progress in remedying it clearly rendered the city
ineligible under the Act's proviso that UDAG funds go "only to cities ... that
have, in the determination of the Secretary, demonstrated results in providing
housing for persons of low and moderate income and in providing equal op-
portunity in housing and employment for low and moderate income persons
and members of minority groups." 203
 Alternatively, plaintiffs requested that
any funding be conditioned on a comprehensive plan to combat discrimina-
2 " This program was added to Title 1 in 1977. Act of October 12, 1977, Pub.
L. No. 95-128, Title I, § 110(b), 91 Stat. 1125 (1977).
201
 42 U.S.C. § 5318(a) (Supp. II 1978).
202 607 F.2d 514 (1st Cir. 1979).
203 42 U.S.C. § 5318(b) (Supp. II 1978).
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tion and its effects. The federal district court dismissed the suit on the ground
that plaintiffs lacked standing. 204
The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed the dismissal and
reinstated the complaint, at least temporarily. 205 The opinion is a textbook
example of the confused law of standing generally, and of the particular
havoc which Simon wreaks in the area of grant litigation. The court first de-
termined that the plaintiffs had no standing to challenge Boston's general
eligibility for UDAG funds. Neither did it adopt the approach of conditioning
grants on an overall remedial plan, Instead, it "construe[d] the complaint as in
effect requesting, in the alternative, that the court take action to ensure that
any project which HUD decides to fund is conducted in compliance with anti-
discrimination laws and the federal constitution." 206 The court reasoned that
under this interpretation of the cases some plaintiffs did have standing: those
who had suffered the injury of inability to find low cost housing in an inte-
grated neighborhood. This injury could be redressed since "although none of
the plaintiffs has specifically alleged an intention to seek housing in a UDAG
financed development, it can reasonably be inferred from their complaint that
they would accept such housing if it were physically safe and financially acces-
sible to them." 207
The principal flaw in this reasoning is that the projects for which funds
were sought involved virtually no such housing. (One project included 365
units of upper income housing; another called for partial rehabilitation of
1,350 units in an area of minority concentration.) 208 , Unless the terms of the
applications were altered, it is hard to see how observance of anti-
discrimination laws would alleviate plaintiffs' housing problems. In order to
find standing the court overlooked the fact that plaintiffs' attack was not so
much on the projects themselves, as on HUD's funding them in an ineligible
city without making Boston take steps to meet the eligibility criteria. Those
steps might well remedy the plaintiffs' housing (and other) problems. 209 The
result is not necessarily a bad one for plaintiffs. Many members of the minor-
ity community have a strong interest in seeing the Boston UDAG projects
constructed and operated in a non-discriminatory way—construction workers
and potential employees, for example. But the confused route by which the
court reached this result is discouraging.
The key to the decision lies in the court's refusal to accept the statutory
interest analysis employed in Coalition, and its apparent agreement with the
Hartford decision. 2 " Examination of section 119 leads to the conclusion that
204 NAACP v. Harris, No. 79-1051 (D. Mass.), rev'd, 607 F.2d 514 (1st Cir.
1979).
292 607 F.2d at 526.
200
	 at 522 (emphasis added).
2" Id. at 525.
208
	 Complaint at 28, 30-31. In a companion case challenging a UDAG
to Chelsea, Mass., the plaintiffs also alleged that HUD's failure to enforce the statute
"decreased their chance to gain employment under Chelsea's CDBG or UDAG pro-
grams." 607 F.2d at 526 (emphasis added).
2 "" Cf. 607 F.2d at 525 n.13 (noting "litany of abuses").
210 Id. at 521-22 (by implication).
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the statutory interest analysis could, and should, have been applied in the
UDAG context. Congress was concerned not only with funding particular
types of projects, but also with the socio-economic conditions of applicant
communities. Awards to cities which had not demonstrated "results in provid-
ing ... equal opportunity in housing and employment for ... members of
minority groups" would harm minorities in those cities by not helping them.
The proviso is a form of incentive designed to reward cities which have
helped minorities and to encourage other cities to do so rather than remain
ineligible for UDAG funds. There also is a substantial likelihood that. a strong
remedial plan along the lines sought by the Boston plaintiffs would have im-
proved their housing opportunities. Thus they should have had standing to
require conditional approval or to have Boston declared ineligible.
The court assumed that a declaration of ineligibility would help no one,
including plaintiffs, other than providing spiteful satisfaction. This, however,
is not necessarily the case. Such a declaration might have serious effects on
Boston's eligibility for other federal funds,'" and Boston would presumably
go to great lengths to avoid this effect. If found ineligible, it would have to
undertake the kind of' systemic remedial action plaintiffs sought.
Given the desirability and visibility of the UDAG projects in question, it is
very unlikely that Boston would have withdrawn its application. Therefore,
the possibility of a declaration of ineligibility increases the likelihood that Bos-
ton would have accepted the conditions which plaintiffs sought. In effect, the
ability to get a declaration of ineligibility is highly beneficial to plaintiffs. 212
Finally, since the court cannot force Boston to take the funds, it can only
order the conditions as part of an either/or decree, assuming plaintiffs prevail
on the merits: either accept the funds subject to conditions or be declared
ineligible. Thus it makes little sense to say that plaintiffs "lacked standing" to
ask for a degree of ineligibility.
It remains to be seen whether the First Circuit's UDAG decision will have
generative force in other areas of community development litigation. For
example, would low-income residents of a non-entitlement community have
standing to challenge its application for a housing rehabilitation grant on the
ground that the real beneficiaries would be upper and moderate-income per-
sons? Under traditional standing doctrine, the answer seems to be no. The
plaintiff's have not suffered any commonly recognized harm from the award,
Nor is there any likely judicial decree which makes them better off; if they
win the community gets nothing. There might be instances where plaintiffs
have their own rehabilitation proposals, and seek declaratory relief that these
proposals should be funded, but the court cannot order the community to
seek funds for them. There is no substantial likelihood of the funds being
available to plaintiffs at all. Plaintiffs in non-entitlement communities must
seek to block their community's receipt of funds. In entitlement communities,
211 Cf. 31 U.S.C.
	 1242 (1976) (a holding that a unit of government has en-
gaged in discrimination triggers proceedings to terminate revenue sharing funds).
212
 The UDAG plaintiffs are not asserting leverage standing of the sort dis-
cussed in note 81 supra. They seek not increased political power but the achievement
of a result desired by Congress.
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by contrast, plaintiffs seek to block approval of the application in its present
form, but want the grant to be awarded so that they can have a second oppor-
tunity to compete for funds.
The best argument for standing in the non-entidement context. is an ex-
tension of the statutory interest analysis applied in Coalition. Under this ap-
proach it can be argued that Congress gave low and moderate income persons
a right to have community development funds used primarily to benefit them,
or at least some of them, and imposed on HUD a correlative duty not to
approve applications that do not confer the intended benefit. Although the
plaintiffs are not worse off as a result of the proposed project, they are not
better off; the project hurts by not helping.
The statutory interest test may well not extend far enough to encompass
this argument. Beyond harm-causation-redressability problems there is a rep-
resentational issue. It may be that not all low and moderate income residents
of a non-entitlement community can possibly benefit even if a proper applica-
tion is filed. Who then should speak for this inchoate class to challenge an
improper application? A far more fundamental problem is "the skepticism we
feel about identifying single causes for complex events. The allocation of the
burden of pleading in Simon ultimately rested on the court's judgment that
plaintiffs should not be granted relief where governmental action has merely
compounded the burdens of indigency."213 The net result may be that no
one has standing to challenge the hypothetical non-entitlement application.
The Coalition court regarded this as an important factor which argued in
favor of standing. 2 " Whether it is a disturbing prospect may depend upon
the extent of one's confidence in HUD to protect vigorously the interests of
low and moderate income persons.
CONCLUSION
Review of the community development cases suggests that the new law of
standing, especially as embodied in Simon, has not been the "insurmountable
obstacle" which some have feared. The courts generally reach decisions—at
times by "muddling through"—which grant standing to those whom Congress
intended to benefit. Still, the muddled nature of many of these decisions is
cause for concern. Perhaps the courts' difficulty in grappling with standing in
the community development cases is strong support for those who would do
away with the doctrine altogether.
Yet, one might advance a more modest. hypothesis. Difficulty in dealing
with standing in these cases is symptomatic of a general lack of familiarity
with federal grant programs. Judicial misunderstanding of the grant system
manifests itself frequently, and is not limited to the community development
context. 215 Perhaps the fault lies not so much with the doctrine of standing,
as with the fact that judges and lawyers alike have yet to recognize the
2" Tushnet, supra note 3, at 687.
214
	 F. Supp. at 51; but If United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 16(i, 174
n.6 (1974) ("substantive issues" may he non-jusiiciahle).
2" See Southern Mut. Help Ass'n, Inc. v. Califano, 574 F.2d 518, 522 (D.C. Cir.
1977) (recognizing the novelty and difficulty of grant litigation).
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emergence of a law of federal grants. When that recognition occurs, when
courts no longer compare grant statutes to "King Minos' labyrinth in ancient
Crete ...," 21 " standing, and a host of other issues, will be far more easily
understood and resolved than is the case today.
2 I City of Hartford v. Towns of Glastonbury, 561 F.2d 1032, 1052 (2d Cir.
14177) (Kaufman, CT, concurring).
